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 Abstract 
The paper develops a model to examine rent seeking in innovation and export licenses, with 
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innovation incentives of the firm lobbying for export restrictions, and the determinants of 
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trade. The findings can help to identify economic inefficiency when the political elites use 
export restrictions to seek rents. 
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1. Introduction  
During 2007-2008, the world experienced a food crisis that triggered export restrictions from 
the largest rice exporting countries, such as India and Vietnam (Slayton, 2009). The 
governments claimed that trade barriers were erected to protect their domestic consumers 
against price increases caused by the food crisis (Tsukada, 2011). There are counter-
arguments from food experts who have questioned the effectiveness of such drastic policies 
in insulating domestic markets against the fluctuations in the world market. First, export 
restrictions introduced in the middle of a price crisis might lead to expectations of further 
price increases. According to Thinh and Tran (2015), suppliers might postpone their current 
trading so that they can sell rice at higher prices in the future. On the other hand, consumers 
and traders might increase their current storage so that they can avoid buying rice at higher 
prices in the future.  
 
Such speculative behaviour is said to exacerbate the price increases that were observed 
during the imposition of export restrictions (see Tsukada, 2011, p. 70; Slayton, 2009, p. 10; 
Baylis, Jolejole-Foreman, and Mallory, 2014, p. 23). Consequently, further price surges 
allow governments to implement additional trade restrictions, thereby creating a vicious 
cycle (Fulton and Reynolds, 2015, p. 1216). While questioning the effectiveness of such 
policies to protect domestic consumers, Fulton and Reynolds (2015) draw attention to other 
possible motivations underlying trade restrictions. These authors argue that export 
restrictions are not only the responses of exporting countries that attempt to secure their 
national food security during food crises, but also a tool that can be used to maximize rents 
captured by their state-owned enterprises. 
 
In Vietnam, trade restrictions have turned state-owned enterprises effectively into 
monopolists and monopsonists in the rice export market. On the one hand, export 
restrictions have prevented small producers and farmers from directly exporting their 
products to the world market, and increased the bargaining positions of large producers that 3 
are mostly state-owned enterprises (Talbot and Nguyen, 2013, p. 12). On the other hand, 
exporting firms have to submit their export contracts to the Vietnam Food Administration 
(VFA), which is effectively a government organization, to request approval (Tsukada, 2011, 
p. 65). However, many generations of CEOs of Vinafood, a state-owned enterprise (SOE), 
are also simultaneously chairs of VFA (Slayton, 2009, p. 14). This creates an enormous 
conflict of interest as the SOEs can manipulate VFA to eliminate strong competitors, while 
the surviving firms risk disclosing their business information to Vinafood.  
 
In addition, even though farmers are the major stakeholders of the export restrictions, they 
have no role in the policy making process. Despite being the organization that is in charge of 
controlling rice exports, VFA only has representatives of state-owned enterprises, without 
any participation of the Farmers’ Union (Tran, Do, and Le, 2013, p. 36). During the export 
restrictions in 2008, the Vietnamese government still allowed the two largest SOEs to fulfill 
their commitments regarding government contracts to the Philippines (Slayton, 2009, p. 10). 
These two SOEs were not obliged to follow export bans, export quotas and minimum export 
prices (Slayton, 2009, p. 10-11; Baylis et al., 2014, p. 4-5). 
 
On the other hand, being almost the only firms that are permitted to export, these SOEs can 
use their market power to buy rice from farmers at depressed prices. It has been stated that 
farmers gained the least during the price peaks in 2008, while state-owned exporters 
captured all the benefits (Tran et al., 2013, p. 28). The difference between export prices and 
paddy rice prices reached their peak during the export ban period (Tran et al., 2013, p. 25), 
which certainly would seem to suggest that exporters used (or possibly abused) their 
monopsony power to reduce paddy rice prices. In this case, export restrictions were used as 
a transfer of profits from farmers and small rice companies to exporting firms.  
 
Similarly, Takacs (1994) shows that the government might use export controls on raw 
materials to support the processing industries that use the raw materials as inputs in their 
production process. In highly concentrated markets, large firms can exercise their 4 
monopsony power against raw material producers (Takacs, 1994, p. 15). However, in spite 
of being vested with so many special and preferential treatments from the government, VFA 
and Vinafood are said to have paid little effort in terms of increasing the sector export 
quality.  
 
In the recent past, the main strategy of Vietnam rice exports was to focus on increasing 
export quantity without concern for quality. Rice production in Vietnam is often considered 
to be of low quality and value (Nguyen and Dinh, 2015; Tran, 2017). Rice that is produced 
in Vietnam often has a lower value (that is, price) than the same type of rice produced in 
Thailand (Nguyen and Dinh, 2015). A common practice of exporting firms is to auction for 
Government-to-Government (G2G) contracts, and to export in large quantities. It is said that 
these G2G contracts comprise in excess of 70 per cent of total rice exports, and are mainly 
under the control of SOEs, who have captured around 70 per cent of total exports (Nguyen 
and Dinh, 2015; Tran et al., 2013; Tran, 2017).  
 
Although the proportion has been decreasing in recent years, G2G contracts still comprise a 
significant amount of Vietnam rice exports. However, this strategy may contain substantial 
risks. The G2G contracts concentrate on some traditional markets, such as the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Malaysia (Nguyen and Dinh, 2015; Tran, 2017). By focusing on only a few 
import countries, the total export quantity and value can easily be affected when there are 
fluctuations in demand from these import markets (Nguyen and Dinh, 2015). Moreover, 
these markets often do not require high quality in rice transactions. Therefore, exporters are 
often awarded G2G contracts on account of offering the lowest prices.  
 
This strategy may be profitable in the short run, but it has damaged the image of Vietnam 
rice exports as a low-quality product. Consequently, this strategy has become a precondition 
for these markets to continue lowering their bidding prices in future auctions. In addition, 
dealing rice contracts at low prices also means that exporting firms must buy paddy rice at 
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depressed prices to sustain their profit margins. Therefore, selling rice of low quality may 
directly harm farmers’ incomes in the long run. 
 
On the other hand, improving export quality has even greater significance when there is an 
increase in competition for G2G contracts from other large rice exporting countries, such as 
Thailand and India. In addition, large rice importing countries are improving their 
production capacities to sustain domestic demand (Nguyen and Dinh, 2015). This 
combination of activities will have a large impact on the incomes of farmers in the Vietnam 
rice industry if the sector continues to depend on these traditional markets, as has been the 
case in the past. Consequently, it is imperative that significant changes are made to the 
quality of rice exports from Vietnam.  
 
The increase in the proportion of high quality rice in total rice exports can help Vietnam 
penetrate higher value markets, such as Japan and Taiwan, and increase its competitiveness 
in traditional markets. This will also assist greatly in improving the living standards of 
farmers in Vietnam. However, the process of adopting new technologies and innovation 
incentives to improve rice quality has been rather slow, and has only received positive 
changes in recent years (Tran, 2017). The stagnation can be attributed to the dominance of 
VFA and state-owned enterprises in the rice export markets.  
 
On the basis of these serious concerns, the primary objective of this paper is to develop a 
model to explain why trade restrictions may result in a lack of innovation incentives to 
increase export quality. The lack of incentives arises from the rents that are provided to the 
SOEs that are not designed to present incentives to exporting firms to increase their adoption 
of innovations. Moreover, the model also explains why trade restrictions can be inefficient, 
and remain in place for an extended period. 
 
In the literature regarding the effects of Vietnam export bans, there are only a few that have 
been concerned about the impacts of such trade policies on the long term development of the 6 
rice sector in Vietnam. This paper intends to contribute to the literature by explaining a 
mechanism whereby a redistribution from farmers to SOEs that are caused by export 
restrictions may impede the sector’s long term development. 
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. A literature review is presented in Section 2. The 
model specification involving the framework, free trade, trade restrictions, comparisons, and 
incentives for lobbying, are discussed in Section 3. Some concluding remarks are given in 
Section 4.  
2. Literature Review  
This paper is closely connected to the literature on the relationship between rent seeking, 
trade restrictions, monopolies, and economic efficiency. Traditionally, the costs of 
monopolies and trade restrictions, such as import tariffs to society, are distortions caused by 
the reduction in the quantity consumed arising from price increases. Such price increases not 
only transfer the surplus from consumers to producers and the government budget, but also 
creates deadweight losses for social welfare (Posner, 1975; Krueger, 1974).  
 
Tullock (1967) argues that the social costs of monopolies and trade restrictions may exceed 
the costs caused by the deadweight loss. The main argument is that, in order to obtain those 
rights, firms have to invest in lobbying and rent seeking, which costs real resources and are 
considered wasteful to society. Tullock (1967, pp. 228-231) describes rent seeking as a form 
of theft. Burglars invest in lock picking technologies in order to steal from their victims, 
while the victims also invest in technologies that are intended to prevent burglars from 
stealing. Such activities are considered wasteful to society as the resources that are used in 
the process could have been used for alternative more productive purposes.  
 
Krueger (1974) highlights an example in which rent seeking does not produce any socially 
valuable by-products. For example, the government may allocate import licenses based on 7 
firms’ capacities. In this case, firms are willing to expand their plants even under excess 
capacity to obtain import rights. Therefore, the investments have no productive purpose 
apart from winning the import licenses. This example is closely related to regulations that 
prevent firms from applying for export licenses in Vietnam. The regulation requires the rice 
exporting firms to have a “minimum capacity of 5,000 tons” and milling facilities with a 
“minimum capacity of 10 tons per hour” (Talbot and Nguyen, 2013, p. 12).  
 
Consequently, firms will have incentives to expand their capacity to receive export rights, 
even though they may not use their full capacity. A traditional strand of rent seeking 
literature, often inspired by the seminal works of Posner (1975) and Krueger (1974), focuses 
on estimating the resources wasted in the rent seeking contest, while ignoring the actual 
impact of the policies resulting from rent seeking on economic development. Addressing 
this concern, the paper analyzes the impacts of export restrictions on a real economic 
variable, such as the level of innovation. In particular, the paper presents a rent seeking 
model in which export restrictions can alter the nature of the economic market structure, and 
directly affect the innovation incentives of the economic players. 
 
The relationship between rent seeking and economic efficiency has been discussed 
extensively in the literature. The traditional political economy models often consider rent 
seeking as a trade-off between the consumer and producer surpluses: incumbent firms and 
new entrant benefits; trade restrictions and liberalizations (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; 
Hillman, 1984; Krueger, 1974; Posner, 1975). Such an approach has left an impression that 
there are unresolved conflicts between rent seeking and economic efficiency, which states 
that rent seeking often leads to inefficient policy outcomes, such as import tariffs and 
monopolies, where such policies may not disappear while such interest groups are still in 
power.  
 
However, Rodrik (2014) offers a different perspective on this matter. Instead of trying to 
eliminate trade restrictions and protectionism, which are often considered the causes of 8 
economic inefficiency, but are heavily protected by powerful interest groups, the analysis 
argues that governments need to find innovative policies and political innovations that can 
bypass such efficiency without jeopardizing the political and economic shares of these 
groups. In that way, policy changes are more feasible as there would be less resistance from 
the lobbying groups. 
 
Regarding the economic efficiency of rent seeking, Khan and Jomo (2000, pp. 40-53) argue 
that, even though the rent seeking process may waste real resources as rent seekers compete 
for rent, its net effect may still be positive to society if the resulting policy outcomes create 
value for society. Such value may arise from Schumpeterian rents or rents for learning that 
create incentives for firms to adopt and invent new technologies. On the other hand, rent 
seeking may be even more detrimental to social welfare if it reduces innovation incentives, 
which is harmful to growth and development.  
 
These concerns justify the need to analyze the potential inefficiency of providing rents to 
exporting firms in the form of trade restrictions. Whether one believes such policy options 
may exist or not, it is important to locate the sources of inefficiency that are caused by the 
policies arising from rent seeking. Moreover, the findings can help to justify the need to 
eliminate trade restrictions and protectionism. Such findings might also be able to contribute 
to the creation of more innovative solutions that can coordinate economic efficiency and 
interest groups. 
 
The literature on the relationship between market structure and innovation may shed light on 
the impact of rent seeking on innovation incentives. According to Brou and Ruta (2013), 
firms lobbying for subsidies and tax cuts can alter the market structure by influencing the 
equilibrium number of firms in the economic market and, therefore, the level of innovation. 
As an alternative, Arrow (1962) argues that the innovation incentives under monopoly are 
lower than under competition.  
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Demsetz (1969) notes that the analysis in Arrow (1962) makes an implicit assumption that 
the monopolist restricts quantity compared with the total quantity under competition. 
Intuitively, the greater the output a firm produces, the more it can use the newly adopted 
marginal cost reducing or quality improving technologies. Such an outcome would justify 
the lower innovation incentives under monopoly as compared with under competition.  
 
However, Holmes, Levine, and Schmitz (2012, p. 12) argue that a reduction in monopoly 
power does not always increase the level of production. The increase in competition caused 
by tariff reductions may eliminate some domestic firms and replace them with foreign firms, 
which reduces domestic output and, consequently, the innovation incentives. This paper 
contributes another channel whereby trade restrictions can lower the monopolist’s 
production and, therefore, their innovation incentives. The reduction in production is caused 
by the replacement effect, in which the monopolist purchases rice from other producers and 
then re-sells the rice to the world market rather than producing and exporting rice 
themselves. 
 
With regard to the causal relationship between innovation and rent seeking, Lenway, Morck, 
and Yeung (1996) argue that firms are more likely to lobby for trade restrictions when they 
are less efficient and have a lower return on investment. These lobbying firms are less likely 
to spend on research and development, which suggests that less innovative firms are more 
badly affected by free trade and have greater incentives to lobby for trade barriers (Lenway 
et al., 1996, pp. 412-415).  
 
Alternatively, the correlation can mean that firms in a more protected industry may have less 
incentive to be innovative. From the analysis in the next section, it is shown that a causal 
relationship between innovation and rent seeking can be interpreted in different ways. A less 
efficient firm may find it beneficial to lobby for trade restrictions, while a highly protected 
firm might find it optimal to reduce innovations under trade restrictions.  10 
3. Model Specification  
a. Framework  
Consider an economy where N firms in the domestic market produce rice and export to the 
world market. The export volume of the domestic country is large enough to influence the 
world price. As the world’s second largest rice exporters in quantity, this assumption is 
entirely appropriate for Vietnam. Therefore, the demand function can be simply represented 
as 𝑃 = 1 − 𝑄 
 
The quality of rice is assumed to be homogeneous. All firms have convex cost functions. 
Firm 1 can reduce its marginal cost by investing in cost reducing technologies. 
Alternatively, firms can compete in a market with differentiated goods, and adoption of 
innovations can lead to an increase in the quality of rice, which increases mark-ups and 
profits. For simplicity, this model focuses on homogeneous products and cost reducing 
innovations. 
 
Suppose that firm 1 is different from other firms in terms of production costs and lobbying 
costs, while firms 2, 3, ..., N are identical. In the case of Vietnam, firm 1 represents a group 
of state-owned enterprises that are given exclusive rights to export rice. On the other hand, 
firms 2, 3, ..., N represent smaller firms and farmers with small market power and low 
capacity to invest in technological improvements. This explains why their innovation 
incentives are constant in the model. 
 
Moreover, firm 1 can be different from firms 2, 3, ..., , N  in terms of their lobbying capacity. 
The assumption that firms can have different “lobbying technologies” reflects the reality that 
some firms, being state-owned enterprises, are closely connected to the government, and are 
thereby more effective in the lobbying process. On the other hand, firms 2, 3, ..., N are small 
rice producers and farmers without strong connections to the state, and thereby do not have 11 
any material effect on export policies. Firm 1 lobbies for trade restrictions to become the 
only firm allowed to export, while the other firms lobby for free trade so that they can export 
freely to the world market.  
 
The model focuses on analyzing firm 1’s innovation and lobbying incentives. First, the 
model analyzes the direct effects of trade restriction on firm 1’s innovation incentives, given 
that the innovation levels of all other firms remain constant. Second, the paper investigates 
the firms’ lobbying incentives. In particular, the analysis focuses on explaining how firm 1’s 
winning probability in the lobbying contest depends on its production efficiency relative to 
the other firms. 
 
In this model, firms compete in two markets, namely the political and economic markets. In 
the political market, firms invest in lobbying activities to decide whether trade restriction are 
implemented. In the economic market, firms decide the optimal level of quantities, and firm 
1 decides its innovation level under the market structure that is decided in th political 
market.  
 
The order of the game is as follows:  
 
Stage 1: Firm 1 lobbies for trade restrictions, while firm 2, ..., N lobbies for free trade. At 
the end of the rent seeking process, the trade regime is decided, and its outcome is observed 
by all firms. 
 
Stage 2: Firm 1 decides how much to invest in cost reducing technologies. After the 
decision is made, all firms observe the cost structures of their competitors.  
 
Stage 3: The firms decide their quantities, given the trade regime and each other’s cost 
functions. 
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There are two possible market structures, namely free trade and trade restrictions. The game 
is solved via backward induction. The model starts to solve the equilibrium profits under the 
two scenarios, then the analysis compares the innovation incentives under both free trade 
and trade restrictions. Subsequently, the lobbying efforts of the firms are analyzed in the 
lobbying contests, given their profits under both free trade and trade restrictions. 
 
 
b. Free trade 
 
Under free trade, every firm is allowed to export to the world market without any 
restrictions. Firms engage in Cournot competition, with the inverse demand function, 
𝑃 = 1 − 𝑄. The firms’ profit functions are:  
  𝜋1𝐹𝑇 = (1 − 𝑄)𝑞1 − (1 − 𝑎)𝑘𝑞12 − 𝛼2 𝑎2 (1) 
  𝜋𝑖𝐹𝑇 = (1 − 𝑄)𝑞𝑖 − 12 𝑞𝑖2,        with 𝑖 = 2, 3, . . . ,𝑁. (2)   
Each firm’s revenue equals price times quantity. Each firm has a convex cost function, 
where k is firm 1’s production efficiency parameter, and firm i’s parameter is 0.5.  A larger k 
implies that firm 1 is more inefficient in production than other firms. Firm 1 can invest in 
cost reducing technologies, a, to reduce the marginal production costs: a must lie between 0 
and 1, so that the marginal production costs remain positive. Innovation incurs a cost of  
𝛼
2
𝑎2.  
 
The first-order condition (FOC) is used to determine the optimal quantities under free trade, 
that is, 𝑞1
𝐹𝑇 and 𝑞𝑖𝐹𝑇:  
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 𝑞1 = 22(1−𝑎)𝑘(𝑁+1)+𝑁+3 (3) 
  𝑞𝑖 = 2(1−𝑎)𝑘+12(1−𝑎)𝑘(𝑁+1)+𝑁+3 ,        with 𝑖 = 2, 3, . . . ,𝑁. (4) 
  
Taking into account that 𝑞1 and 𝑞𝑖 are to be chosen optimally, it is possible to determine the 
marginal effect of a change in the innovation term, a, on firm 1’s equilibrium profit under 
free trade (see Appendix A.1):  
 
       𝑑𝜋1𝐹𝑇
𝑑𝑎
= 4𝑘�2�1−𝑎𝐹𝑇�𝑘(𝑁+1)+3𝑁+1�[2(1−𝑎𝐹𝑇)𝑘(𝑁+1)+𝑁+3]3 −  𝛼𝑎𝐹𝑇   (5)  
 
c. Trade Restrictions  
Under trade restrictions, only firm 1 is allowed to export, while the other firms cannot export 
directly to the world market. In order to export, firms 2, ..., N have to become firm 1’s 
suppliers. Suppose that the number of firms N is large such that, using its bargaining power, 
firm 1 can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other firms. Firms 2, ..., N can either accept 
or reject the offer, but they cannot bargain to change the design of the offer are there are 
many unco-ordinated firms. The offer can have a form of a pair 𝑞𝑗  and 𝑡𝑗  : 𝑞𝑗  is the 
quantity that firm 1 demands and 𝑡𝑗  is the transfer payment to firm j. As firm 1 has the 
power to set the offer, they have no incentive to give firms 2, ..., N  more favourable terms. 
However, the offer must be designed so that firms 2, ..., N would be willing to accept the 
offer if their profits are positive.  
 
Assuming that firm 1 has full information about the cost structures of firms 2, ..., N, the 
transfers from firm 1 to the other firms will be sufficient to cover their costs and to 
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incentivize acceptance of the offer. Consequently, the profit functions of firm 1 and firm i 
under trade restrictions are:   
 
𝜋1
𝑇𝑅 = (1 −𝑄)𝑞1 − (1 − 𝑎)𝑘𝑞12 − 𝛼2 𝑎12 + (1 − 𝑄)∑  𝑁𝑖=2 𝑞𝑖 − 12∑  𝑁𝑖=2 𝑞𝑖2 (6) 
 
𝜋𝑖
𝑇𝑅 = 0. (7)  
As the other firms have convex cost functions, the more firm 1 buys from one particular 
firm, the more costly does it become. In addition, the other firms are identical so that, in 
order to minimize the buying prices, the best strategy for firm 1 is to buy the same quantities 
from every firm i.  
 
Firm 1’s profit function becomes:   
𝜋1
𝑇𝑅 = (1 −𝑄)𝑞1 − (1 − 𝑎)𝑘𝑞12 − 𝛼2 𝑎2 + (1 − 𝑄)(𝑁 − 1)𝑞𝑖 − 12(𝑁−1)𝑞𝑖2 . (8)   
The first-order condition to determine the optimal 𝑞1 and 𝑞𝑖 are:  
  𝑞1 = 12 11+(1−𝑎)𝑘(2𝑁−1) (9) 
  𝑞𝑖 = (1−𝑎)𝑘1+(1−𝑎)𝑘(2𝑁−1)  (10)  
 Taking into account that 𝑞1  and 𝑞𝑖  are chosen optimally, it is possible to determine the 
marginal effect of a change in a on firm 1’s equilibrium profits under trade restrictions (see 
Appendix A.2):   15 
           𝑑𝜋1𝑇𝑅
𝑑𝑎
= 14𝑘[1+(1−𝑎)𝑘(2𝑁−1)]2 − 𝛼𝑎  (11) 
 
 
d. Comparison 
 
When k is sufficiently large, firm 1’s production under trade restrictions is lower than under 
free trade.  This section will illustrate the changes in firm 1’s behaviour under trade 
restrictions as compared with under free trade. The changes will affect firm 1’s innovation 
incentives under trade restrictions. Under free trade, there is a strategic effect, where firm 1 
can reduce the quantities of the other firms by reducing its marginal costs through investing 
in technology and innovation:  
 
𝑞𝑖 = 2(1 − 𝑎)𝑘 + 12(1 − 𝑎)𝑘(𝑁 + 1) + 𝑁 + 3  
Consequently, the prices increase and firm 1 has an incentive to expand is production due to 
having lower marginal costs. Therefore, firm 1 has strong incentives to invest in 
technologies to reduce marginal costs. However, such strategic effect disappears under trade 
restrictions as firm 1 effectivelybecomes a monopoly in the export market. The strategic 
effect is replaced by the monopoly effect and the replacement effect. On the one hand, being 
a monopoly makes firm 1 restrict the total export quantity.   
As the result, the monopoly effect reduces the total export quantiity, so that  𝑄𝑇𝑅 < 𝑄𝐹𝑇  
(see Appendix A.3). Under a restricted total export quantity, firm 1 has to choose the most 
efficient combination between self-production and purchasing from other firms, which can 
lead to a lower or higher 𝑞1 under trade restrictions than under free trade. It is useful to 
consider the optimal quantities 𝑞1
𝑇𝑅  and 𝑞𝑖𝑇𝑅  from equations (9) and (10), respectively, 
without the innovation term:  
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 𝑞1 = 12 11+𝑘(2𝑁−1) 
  𝑞𝑖 = 𝑘1+𝑘(2𝑁−1)  
so that  
∂𝑞1
∂𝑘
< 0   and  ∂𝑞𝑖
∂𝑘
> 0 . This means that if firm 1 is efficient, it may prefer 
producing itself to buying from other firms under trade restriction. On the other hand, if firm 
1 is inefficient, it will reduce its own production and increase the quantities bought from 
other firms. The replacement effect happens when firm 1 becomes sufficiently inefficient, so 
that  𝑞1𝑇𝑅 < 𝑞1𝐹𝑇 (see Appendix A.4).   
 
When  𝑞1𝑇𝑅 < 𝑞1𝐹𝑇 , firm 1’s innovation incentives under trade restrictions is lower than 
under free trade. Intuitively, innovation becomes more valuable when it can be applied to a 
larger quantity. This effect can be shown by comparing the total costs of firm 1 with and 
without the innovation term, a: 
 Total costs (with a) = (1 − 𝑎)𝑘𝑞2 ; 
 Total costs (without a) = 𝑘𝑞2 ; 
 
ΔTotal costs = 𝑎𝑘𝑞2.   
The total costs saved is dependent on the total quantity. Therefore, a lower quantity may 
weaken firm 1’s innovation incentives under trade restrictions. It might be conjectured that 
when 𝑞1𝑇𝑅 < 𝑞1𝐹𝑇, it is likely that the innovation level under trade restrictions is lower than 
under free trade.  
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In order to confirm this intuition, consider again the marginal effect of a change in the 
innovation term, a, on firm 1’s equilibrium profits under free trade and under trade 
restrictions, taking into account that 𝑞1 and 𝑞𝑖 are chosen optimally under each scenario:  
  
𝑑𝜋1
𝐹𝑇
𝑑𝑎
= 4𝑘[2(1 − 𝑎𝐹𝑇)𝑘(𝑁 + 1) + 3𝑁 + 1][2(1 − 𝑎𝐹𝑇)𝑘(𝑁 + 1) + 𝑁 + 3]3 − 𝛼𝑎𝐹𝑇 
 
𝑑𝜋1
𝑇𝑅
𝑑𝑎
= 𝑘4 [1 + (1 − 𝑎)𝑘(2𝑁 − 1)]2 − 𝛼𝑎 
 
Simplifying the above functions using the optimal quantities 𝑞1
𝐹𝑇 and 𝑞1𝑇𝑅  from equations 
(3) and (9) leads to:  
  𝑑𝜋1𝐹𝑇
𝑑𝑎
= 𝑘[2(1 − 𝑎)𝑘(𝑁 + 1) + 3𝑁 + 1](𝑞1𝐹𝑇)2 − 𝛼𝑎 (12) 
  𝑑𝜋1𝑇𝑅
𝑑𝑎
= 𝑘(𝑞1𝑇𝑅)2 − 𝛼𝑎. (13)   
Therefore, the innovation incentive under free trade is higher than under trade restrictions 
when firm 1’s optimal quantity under free trade is greater than under trade restrictions. On 
the other hand, firm 1 may have a greater incentive to innovate under trade restrictions than 
under free trade when its optimal quantity under trade restrictions is, in fact, greater than 
under free trade. 
 
e. Rent Seeking Model 
 
This is the state in which firms lobby for their favourable market structure based on their 
expected payoff and lobbying cost functions. The analysis assumes that the probability that 
firm 1 wins the rent seeking contest equals the proportion of firm 1’s lobbying effort in the 
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total rent seeking efforts, called 𝑃1. This is also the probability that export restrictions are 
realized. On the other hand, other firms can lobby against trade restrictions by increasing the 
total rent seeking efforts to dilute firm 1’s probability of winning.  
 
The probability that free trade is realized, therefore, equals 1 − 𝑃1. Their lobbying costs 
increase with their rent seeking efforts. Firms may have different lobbying cost functions, 
and it is assumed that firm 1 is the only firm that can lobby for trade restrictions: 
 
 𝑉1 = 𝑥1𝑥1+∑  𝑁𝑖=2𝑥𝑖 𝜋1𝑇𝑅 + �1 − 𝑥1𝑥1+∑  𝑁𝑖=2𝑥𝑖� 𝜋1𝐹𝑇 − 𝑘𝑙𝑥1 (14) 
 
 𝑉2 = �1 − 𝑥1𝑥1+∑  𝑁𝑖=2𝑥𝑖� 𝜋𝑖𝐹𝑇 − 𝑚𝑙𝑥𝑖  (15) 
  
 𝑃1 = 𝑥1𝑥1+∑  𝑁𝑖=2 𝑥𝑖 (16) 
 
Firm 1 may be more well connected to the government than are the other firms, which 
makes it more efficient in the lobbying contest for export restrictions, where 𝑘𝑙  and 𝑚𝑙  
denote firm 1’s and firm i’s lobbying efficiency parameters, respectively. Firm 1’s payoff 
function, 𝑉1 equals the sum of its expected profit under trade restrictions and its expected 
profit under free trade, minus its lobbying costs. Similarly, firm i’s payoff function, 𝑉2 , 
equals its expected profit under free trade minus its lobbying costs.  
 
The FOCs of the expected payoffs with respect to 𝑥1 and 𝑥𝑖  are:  
  (𝜋1𝑇𝑅−𝜋1𝐹𝑇)∑  𝑁𝑖=2𝑥𝑖(𝑥1+∑  𝑁𝑖=2𝑥𝑖)2 − 𝑘𝑙 = 0 (17) 
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 𝜋𝑖𝐹𝑇𝑥1(𝑥1+∑  𝑁𝑖=2𝑥𝑖)2 − 𝑚𝑙 = 0 (18)   
From the above functions, it can be shown that a firms’ willingness to increase their 
lobbying efforts is proportional to their gains from lobbying. For firm 1, its gain from 
lobbying is the difference between its profit under trade restrictions and under free trade. For 
firm i, their gains from lobbying are their profits under free trade. Moreover, if firm 1 is 
more efficient in lobbying, which means that k is small, then it is more willing to invest in 
the lobbying contest:  
              
𝑥1
∑  𝑁𝑖=2𝑥𝑖 = 𝑚𝑘 �𝜋1𝑇𝑅−𝜋1𝐹𝑇𝜋𝑖𝐹𝑇 �  (19) 
 
Firm 1’s probability of winning the rent seeking contest can be determined using the above 
equation:        
𝑃 = 𝑥1
𝑥1+∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=2  = 𝑚𝑙�𝜋1𝑇𝑅−𝜋1𝐹𝑇�𝑘𝑙𝜋𝑖𝐹𝑇+𝑚𝑙�𝜋1𝑇𝑅−𝜋1𝐹𝑇�   (20)  
 
f. Incentives for Lobbying  
This section demonstrates how firm 1’s relative efficiency in production as compared with 
the other firms can change their gains from lobbying, as well as their incentives to lobby. 
Consider the following more simplified profit functions under free trade and trade 
restrictions:  
  
𝜋1
𝐹𝑇 = (1 − 𝑄)𝑞1 − 𝑞12 (21) 
  
𝜋𝑖
𝐹𝑇 = (1 − 𝑄)𝑞𝑖 − 𝑚𝑝𝑞𝑖2 (22) 20 
  
𝜋_1^𝑇𝑅 = (1 − 𝑄) 𝑞_1 − 𝑞_1^2 + (1 −𝑄)(𝑁 − 1) 𝑞_𝑖 − 𝑚_𝑝 (𝑁 − 1) 𝑞_𝑖^2  (23) 
 
In order to simplify the analysis, the innovation term is considered fixed and firm 1’s 
production efficiency parameter is normalized to 1, while 𝑚𝑝  is treated as the relative 
efficiency of other firms as compared with firm 1.  
 
The purpose of the analysis is to understand what would happen to firm 1’s probability of 
winning when the other firms become more efficient as compared with firm 1. 
 
After solving for the optimal outputs 𝑞1  and 𝑞𝑖  in each case (see Appendix A.5), the 
equilibrium profit functions become:  
 
 𝜋1
𝐹𝑇 = 2 � 2𝑚𝑝+1
3𝑁+8𝑚𝑝+1
�
2
 (24) 
 
 𝜋𝑖
𝐹𝑇 = (𝑚𝑝 + 1) � 33𝑁+8𝑚𝑝+1�2 (25) 
 
 𝜋1
𝑇𝑅 = 𝑚𝑝+𝑁−1
4(2𝑚𝑝+𝑁−1) (26) 
 
If 𝑁 > 8𝑚𝑝+15
3
, the probability that firm 1 wins the lobbying contest decreases with 𝑚𝑝. 
From equation (20), it is possible to determine the marginal effect of a change in 𝑚𝑝 on 
firm 1’s winning probability:  
 
 
∂𝑃
∂𝑚𝑝
= 𝑧 �𝜋𝑖𝐹𝑇 ∂�𝜋1𝑇𝑅−𝜋1𝐹𝑇�∂𝑚𝑝 − (𝜋1𝑇𝑅 − 𝜋1𝐹𝑇) ∂𝜋𝑖𝐹𝑇∂𝑚𝑝 � (27) 
 
 𝑧 = 𝑚𝑙𝑘𝑙
�𝑘𝑙𝜋𝑖
𝐹𝑇+𝑚𝑙�𝜋1
𝑇𝑅−𝜋1
𝐹𝑇��
2 (28) 
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It can be seen that the marginal effect of a change in firm 1’s relative efficiency on the 
probability of winning depends on two terms: 
𝛿�𝜋1
𝑇𝑅−𝜋1
𝐹𝑇�
𝛿𝑚𝑝
  and  𝛿𝜋𝑖
𝐹𝑇
𝛿𝑚𝑝
. The first term is the 
marginal effect of a change in 𝑚𝑝 on firm 1’s gains from lobbying. Firm 1’s gains from 
lobbying are the difference between its profits under trade restrictions and free trade. Under 
free trade, firm 1 has to compete with firms 2, ..., N in Cournot competition.  
 
The more efficient is firm i, the more competitive does the market become, which has a 
negative effect on firm 1’s profits. Therefore, firm 1’s free trade profit is negatively affected 
by a decrease of 𝑚𝑝. This can be shown by considering the marginal effect of a change in 
𝑚𝑝 on firm 1’s profit under free trade:  
 
∂𝜋1
𝐹𝑇
∂𝑚𝑝
= 4� 2𝑚 + 13𝑁 + 8𝑚𝑝 + 1� 6(𝑁 − 1)(3𝑁 + 8𝑚𝑝 + 1)3 > 0 
 
However, under trade restrictions, the more efficient firm i can supply firm 1 with cheaper 
inputs. Therefore, the profit of firm 1 under trade restrictions is positively affected by a 
decrease in 𝑚𝑝. This can be shown by considering the marginal effect of a change in 𝑚𝑝 on 
firm 1’s profit under trade restrictions:  
 
                ∂𝜋1
𝑇𝑅
∂𝑚𝑝
= −(𝑁−1)
4(2𝑚𝑝+𝑁−1 < 0. 
 
 
Therefore, firm 1’s gains from lobbying will increase when other firms become relatively 
more efficient, which makes the first term negative:  
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                               ∂�𝜋1
𝑇𝑅−𝜋1
𝐹𝑇�
∂𝑚𝑝
< 0.  (29) 
  
Consider the marginal effect of a change in 𝑚𝑝 on firm i’s free trade profits:  
 
∂𝜋𝑖
𝐹𝑇
∂𝑚𝑝
= 9(3𝑁 − 8𝑚𝑝 − 15)(3𝑁 + 8𝑚𝑝 + 1)3  
 
 
If 𝑁 > 8𝑚𝑝+15
3
, then  ∂𝜋𝑖
𝐹𝑇
∂𝑚𝑝
> 0. This means that, when there are too many firms in the 
export market, reducing 𝑚𝑝 may lead to an increase in competition, which decreases firm 
i’s equilibrium profits. Therefore, when N is sufficiently large, the following inequality 
holds:  
 
𝜋𝑖
𝐹𝑇 ∂(𝜋1𝑇𝑅 − 𝜋1𝐹𝑇)
∂𝑚𝑝
− (𝜋1𝑇𝑅 − 𝜋1𝐹𝑇) ∂𝜋𝑖𝐹𝑇∂𝑚𝑝 > 0 
 
The analysis demonstrates the fact that firm 1 may feel threatened by the entry of relatively 
more efficient firms. Consequently, the threat forces firm 1 to try to influence the 
government. By participating in the rent seeking contest, firm 1 can lobby for trade 
restrictions in order to neutralize the harmful effects of the entering firms on its profits.  
 
Under trade restrictions, firm 1 can avoid direct competition with other firms, and turn them 
into its suppliers. Thus, firm 1 will have greater incentives to lobby for trade restrictions 
when there are more firms with greater efficiency that enter the export market. 
Consequently, firm 1 will have a higher probability of winning the rent seeking contest, and 
trade restrictions are more likely to be realized. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
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The market structure under trade restrictions has changed exporter behaviour in a unique 
way. Based on the findings of the paper, if exporters are very efficient, they are more likely 
to expand their production under trade restriction as compared with that under free trade. 
The increased production will increase the innovation incentives of exporters under trade 
restrictions. On the other hand, trade restrictions have increased exporter bargaining power, 
so that there is a reduction in the input prices that exporters pay to other producers.  
 
Therefore, an inefficient exporter would choose to buy rice from other firms and re-sell on 
the world market instead of producing rice themselves. Consequently, a low production level 
will reduce innovation incentives because the value of innovation is dependent on the level 
of production. On the other hand, inefficient exporters are more likely to be hurt by 
competition with efficient firms under free trade. Moreover, being able to buy inputs of rice 
at cheap prices is more valuable to these firms as compared with more efficient firms. 
Consequently, these inefficient firms are more likely to lobby for trade restrictions. 
 
For a long time, Vinafood companies have held a dominant role in the rice export market, 
with around 40-50 per cent of the total export quantity. On the other hand, their profits are 
heavily dependent on G2G contracts, which are often exported in large quantities. It is said 
that around 50 per cent of Vinafoods exports are from G2G contracts (Tran et al., 2013). 
However, these firms do not grow their own rice to fulfill their contracts. Instead, they 
depend on the rice supply collected from farmers and other producers. The nature of their 
business model, which is based on trading rice in the export market rather than producing 
rice, explains why these exporters are reluctant to invest in technologies and innovations to 
increase export quality. On the other hand, the SOEs often win the auctions for these 
contracts by offering the lowest prices.  
 
Moreover, the same SOEs often collect rice from merchants and intermediaries immediately 
after winning the auction, without preparing their own supply sources in advance. Thus, the 
only choice for them is to buy rice as inputs at spot prices. From the rent seeking 24 
perspective, these firms are likely to lobby for export restriction from the time the auctions 
start until the designated delivery date. The first reason is to reduce potential competitors 
who might undercut them in the auctions; second, the exporters can collect rice from the 
spot market at lower prices. 
 
Even though the export restrictions may have caused some inefficiencies, a complete 
liberalization of the rice export market is unlikely to occur immediately, especially in view 
of the rents received by the political elite. On the other hand, the government still has to face 
the pressure of increasing export quality. There are possible ways that the government can 
make export restrictions a better policy to foster the adoption of innovations. If the objective 
of export restrictions is to retain the leading roles of SOEs in the export market, the policy 
should be adjusted so that these SOEs have incentives to increase the competitiveness of rice 
exports from Vietnam.  
 
If government policy were designed appropriately, the adoption of innovations should be an 
essential condition to provide and maintain food company export rights in the export market. 
In particular, monopoly rights should be withdrawn when the SOEs are not able to commit 
themselves to specified innovation objectives. From the analysis presented in the paper, 
fostering exporter self-production might be suggestive to increase their innovation incentives 
under export restrictions. This condition could prevent firm 1 from only buying from other 
firms and neglecting innovation activities. In general, more innovative policies and political 
innovations would seem to be required in order to manage the practice of providing rents 
effectively.   
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Appendix  
A.1  Free Trade Equilibrium  Given:  
  with i = 2, 3, ..., N,  
the first-order conditions (FOC) of   and πiFT  with respect to q1 and qi, are: 
 
= 0 
= 0  The equilibria    and  qiFT  are:  
 , with i = 2, 3, ..., N.  
The total quantity and price level are: 26 
 
 
The free trade profit function of firm 1 is: 
  
  
Simplifying the equation:  
 
 
the first-order condition with respect to a is:   
 
 
A.2  Trade Restrictions Equilibrium  
 Given:  
27 
  
The FOC of   and πiTR  with respect to q1 and qi are:  
− q1 + 1 − q1 − (N − 1)qi − 2(1 − a)kq1 − (N − 1)qi = 0  
− (N − 1)q1 − (N − 1)2qi + [1 − q1 − (N − 1)q1](N − 1) − (N − 1)qi = 0  
The equilibria for q1 and qi are:  
  
The total quantity and the price level are:   
  
The trade restriction profit function of firm 1 is:  28 
  
Simplifying the equation:  
  
the FOC with respect to a is:  
 
 
A.3     Monopoly Effect Equilibrium   
 
               QTR < QFT  
 
we have:  
 
 
      1  29 
 
 
when N  ≥ 3, and:  
  
   
Therefore, the original inequality holds when N  ≥ 3.  
A.4 Condition that    holds (when there is no innovation)   
 
 
A.5     Equilibrium profits without innovation 
 
π1FT = (1 − Q)q1 − q12 πiFT = 
(1 − Q)qi − mpqi2 
 
π1TR = (1 − Q)q1 − q12 + (1 − Q)(N − 1)qi − mp(N − 1)qi2   30 
Optimal quantities:  
  
Equilibrium profits: 
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